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Background: Disease-specific stem cell therapies, created from induced pluripotent stem cell lines containing the
genetic defects responsible for a particular disease, have the potential to revolutionize the treatment of refractory
chronic diseases. Given their capacity to differentiate into any human cell type, these cell lines might be
reprogrammed to correct a disease-causing genetic defect in any tissue or organ, in addition to offering a more
clinically realistic model for testing new drugs and studying disease mechanisms. Clinical translation of these therapies
provides an opportunity to design a more systematic, accessible and patient-influenced model for the delivery of
medically innovative treatments to chronically ill patients.
Discussion: I focus on disease-specific cell therapies because the types of patients who would benefit from them have
congenital, severe, high-maintenance chronic conditions. They accordingly have a very strong claim for medical need
and therapeutic intervention, must interact regularly with health providers, and so have the greatest stake in influencing,
at a systemic level, the way their care is delivered. Given such patients’ shared, aggregate needs for societal support and
access to medical innovation, they constitute “patient communities”. To reify the relevance of patient communities within
a clinical context, I propose competitive grants or “prizes” to spur innovation in delivery of care, promoting “prosocial”
values of transparency, equity, patient empowerment, and patient-provider and inter-institutional collaboration. As
facilitators of participant-driven advocacy for health and quality of life-improving measures, patient communities may be
synergistic with the broad-based, geo-culturally embedded public health networks typically referred to as “communities”
in the public health literature.
Summary: Prosocial values acquire a strong ethical justification based on shared need, and can be clearly defined as
grant criteria, when applied to patients such as those who will benefit from disease-specific stem cell treatments. Within
this context, prosociality aims not just to expand patients’ treatment choices, but also their opportunities to take a more
active role in the management of their own care and contribute towards shared goals through better-informed
advocacy. Accordingly, prosociality promotes relational autonomy as well as other basic bioethical principles, including
beneficence and a holistic, relational conception of human dignity.
Keywords: Stem cells, Communitarianism, Cultural studies, Patient advocacy, Moral philosophy, Behavioral economicsBackground
When we talk about medical innovation, we are typically
referring to new drug treatments or therapies. In recent
years, however, stem cells have come to represent an
archetypal form of medical innovation—their potential
to differentiate and repopulate any cell type raises the
possibility of a paradigm shift in medical therapy, based
on a largely untapped but theoretically almost limitless
promise of regeneration [1,2]. But what about innovationCorrespondence: rgs63@case.edu
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unless otherwise stated.in delivery of care for the patients with chronic condi-
tions who will likely benefit from such therapies?
This article describes an incentive system, and pro-
vides an ethical basis, for a more systematic, accessible,
and patient-influenced approach to delivery of medically
innovative stem-cell treatments, embodying a concept
which I refer to as “prosociality” [3]. The aim is to show
that a patient community can amount to more than a
mere logistical convenience, a means of expediently
grouping together clumps of patients for purposes of in-
surance billing or clinical data collection. A prosocial
system is ethically premised on the recognition ofis an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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entailing the ethical importance and indeed essentialness
of the concept of a community of patients. Consequently,
incentives which seek to improve both patient care and
experience should be more relationally focused and
patient-directed. Indeed, a community of patients with a
given chronic condition can serve as a mediator and a
source of empowerment for its members, who must nego-
tiate their care within the world of health care.
While the attendant requirement of aggregate, shared,
and consistent need results in a strict definition of a pa-
tient community, this is in no way intended to introduce
a concept in opposition to the kind of broad-based, geo-
culturally embedded public health network which is typ-
ically what the public health literature refers to as a
“community”. Indeed, as explained later, public health
networks (as well as regulatory or grant-making bodies
on which patient advocates are represented) can serve as
an interface through which more strictly defined patient
communities can interact with more broad-based groups
or coalitions, advocating together for health and quality-
of-life-improving measures.
This article focuses on disease-specific iPS cell therap-
ies because the types of patients who would benefit from
them have congenital, severe, high-maintenance chronic
conditions (such as Fanconi Anemia, Gaucher Disease,
Spinal Muscular Atrophy, and Severe Congenital Im-
munodeficiency Syndrome). They accordingly have a
very strong claim for medical need and therapeutic
intervention, must necessarily interact regularly with
health providers, and so have the greatest stake in influ-
encing, at a systemic level, the way their care is delivered.
Moreover, the emergence and clinical testing of disease-
specific stem-cell therapies offers an opportunity to de-
sign a new system for delivery of medically innovative
treatments to patients with chronic conditions, espe-
cially given the scale of societal resources involved in
their development. In the U.S., NIH (the National Insti-
tutes of Health) distributed nearly $1.5 billion for em-
bryonic and non-embryonic stem cell research in 2012
alone, to say nothing of the manpower used and infor-
mation collected [4].
Indeed, disease-specific stem cell therapies, created from
cell lines containing the genetic defects responsible for a
particular disease, have the potential to revolutionize the
treatment of refractory chronic diseases. Given their cap-
acity to differentiate into any human cell type, these cell
lines might be reprogrammed to correct a disease-causing
genetic defect in any tissue or organ, in addition to offer-
ing a more clinically realistic model for testing new drugs
and studying disease mechanisms [5,6].a Relevant to the
focus on patient communities, in the U.S. virtually all of
the diseases which are the subject of iPS research are also
associated with eponymous foundations (e.g. the FanconiAnemia Fund and Spinal Muscular Atrophy Foundation),
which support research for their respective diseases.
The present proposal would thus require optimizing,
at a community level, the care delivery experience for
patients with the types of chronic diseases which are the
subject of disease-specific stem-cell research, so as to fa-
cilitate patients’ equitable access to therapies, engage-
ment in advocacy, research participation, and awareness
of the treatment options and clinical and quality-of-life
implications of their conditions (consistent with patients’
or guardians’ preferences and informed consent). Such a
system would ensure that when the benefits of stem cell
research materialize on a larger clinical scale, they do so
in such a way as to reify the concept of the patient com-
munity as an organizing principle for health care, via four
core values—transparency, equity, patient empowerment,
and inter-institutional and patient-provider collaboration.
The value of equity is particularly critical within the con-
text of disease-specific stem-cell therapies, given that they
are highly specialized biologics which tend to be much
more expensive than standard primary care services.
Altogether, these principles complement and partially
overlap the social justice goals of the International Society
for Stem Cell Research [7]. No guidelines either proposed
or implemented, however, distinguish them within a
shared context, apply them to translational iPS research,
or explain how they might operate synergistically by
strengthening patient communities.
This discussion is not solely concerned with how pro-
viders should interact with individual patients, as is much
of the bioethical literature. The proposal does not just seek
to incentivize the care delivery system to be patient-
centered in terms of a top-down respect by providers and
institutions for patient autonomy. Perhaps more conse-
quentially, it would aim to cultivate patient communities
as important stakeholder groups, with more scope to dy-
namically influence policy at the institutional and perhaps
even the regulatory level. Stem-cell research involves a
broad array of societal stakeholders, including regulatory
decisionmakers, translational researchers in academia, and
private companies. The utimate goal is to establish a more
rhizomatic structure for patient-provider and patient-
society interaction, one which would afford opportunities
for lateral, less hierarchical, and more closely intertwined
channels of patient feedback which can exert meaningful
influence on patient care. Should regulators, medical
leaders and funders choose to embrace the values under-
lying my proposal, my hope is that medical centers would
re-orient care delivery so as to interact with patients at the
level of patient communities, better positioning all pa-
tients to actively address their shared medical needs and
achieve shared goals —improving quality-of-life by improv-
ing health, and promoting relational autonomy through
collective engagement.
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medical technology, criteria are set forth for operationaliz-
ing these values via competitive grants or prizes targeted
toward academic medical centers (perhaps in partnership
with community health practices). Competitive grants for
care delivery are inspired “prizes” which aim to spur
innovation in health care and eco-sustainable technology.
Such prizes may be offered by for-profit or not-for-profit
entities, and even constitute the basis for a proposed alter-
native to the United States’ existing patent system, via
the Medical Innovation Prize Act [8].b The goal is to
incentivize these centers to develop, test, and refine strat-
egies for a prosocial model of care delivery. These princi-
ples, when working in tandem as embodied in the patient
community, not only do not infringe on autonomy, but
promote both it and other basic bioethical values, includ-
ing beneficence and bioethicist Charles Foster’s holistic,
relational conception of human dignity [9].
Discussion
Bringing prosocial values to translational iPS cell research
In the U.S., such patient communities, often via local chap-
ters of disease-specific foundations, are already active at the
national or local level in policy advocacy and campaigns for
research funding, and would benefit alike from develop-
ments in disease-specific stem cell therapies. In addition to
the potential for government funding or public-private part-
nerships, foundations may be able to partner with each
other to fund such grants, which could take into account a
broad subset of chronic diseases treated at academic med-
ical centers. Various metrics which are suggested for gran-
tmaking, as well as the very existence of the grants, might
encourage the implementation of the core principles of pro-
sociality—transparency, equity, patient empowerment, and
collaboration—which are altogether broadly consistent with
the International Society for Stem Cell Research Guidelines
for Clinical Translation [7]. At the most basic level, the
collection and publication of data relevant to the awarding
of grants will promote transparency.
Equity is also critically relevant, given the high cost of
stem-cell based therapies and their highly concentrated
development and translational testing at certain highly
specialized academic medical centers. The high expense
of stem cell therapies, and related concerns about equity
and access, stem from their speculative nature, the de-
gree of technical and laboratory manipulation involved
in their development and production, and the need for
companies to earn a financial return on the investment
costs and decades’ worth of research necessary to de-
velop efficacious and safe products. Currently an allo-
geneic bone marrow transplant can cost up to $200,000
in the U.S. [10]. To assess the equity of translational re-
search and clinical care delivery, it is essential to haveaccess to the demographic and socio-economic compos-
ition of stem cell research participants, or those receiv-
ing experimental therapies, as recommended by the
ISSCR [7]. In the U.S. a comparison of the percentage of
Medicaid vs. non-Medicaid c participants might be help-
ful. In any case, nuanced analysis of data might allow for
the identification of underserved patients in particular
demographic or SES categories, and accordingly grant
points could be awarded for measures to improve access
among these patients, to the extent medically appropriate
and logistically feasible. In addition to promoting equity,
systemwide analysis of patterns of enrollment in clinical
trials or access to therapies, stratified by medical condition
and aligned with degree and urgency of medical need, ap-
propriateness of intervention, etc. could serve as broader
measures of implementation. Overall, the grants would
incentivize, at the level of institutional policy, improved
awareness among patients of clinical trials and treatment
options, knowledge of their condition and its clinical im-
plications (should they wish to know), and opportunities
for collaborating, supporting and sharing experiences with
other patients and families with their condition, via sup-
port groups or advocacy. In the subsequent discussion of
the proposal’s autonomy-enhancing potential, these qual-
ities are referred to as “patient empowerment”.
Indeed, grant criteria could measure the extent to which
patient support groups can attract provider participation
and integrate with medical centers’ existing supportive care
programs (e.g. for counseling, coping skills, and logistical
aid), partner with foundations and advocacy organizations,
and offer opportunities for patient-submitted feedback.
This would foster collaboration among patients with the
same condition (members of the same patient community),
as well as between patients and providers. To promote
both inter-institutional collaboration and equity, I recom-
mend that institutions also receive grant points for sending
patients to other centers which offer clinical trials, therap-
ies, or procedures for which the referred patients might be
good candidates. Patient satisfaction or awareness surveys
might help determine patients’ perception of the adequacy
of their access to information about clinical trials, daily
coping methods, or experimental therapies (this last being
most relevant in life-critical situations). Standardizing such
surveys would allow for fair and consistent comparison of
medical centers, and could be accomplished with input
from a broad range of centers. Indeed, some measures of
patient experience, not just clinical outcomes, must be
available. By developing grants contingent on all these
measures and publishing the data, providers would be en-
couraged to make the sharing of such information a matter
of routine practice.
The ISSCR further notes that “access [to stem cell
therapies] will depend on financial terms and business
models that are perceived as fair by all stakeholders,
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governments” [7]. By contributing to a better-informed
patient community—more active in policy advocacy and
the management of their care, and with more options and
resources for communicating and collaborating with pa-
tient advocates in decisionmaking roles—the present pro-
posal would thus advance the ISSCR’s goal of fostering a
more inclusive public discussion with a greater influence
on policy outcomes. Grant criteria could further improve
transparency by encouraging the publication, for public
benefit, of data on experimental therapies for individuals
(which, if successful, would hopefully suggest a basis for
future trials), as recommended by the ISSCR [7].
Defining the community of needs
Much of the recent literature in health policy and public
health recommends that care delivery systems should
adopt a population-level or community focus in trying
to optimize health outcomes [11,12]. Indeed, few studies
have analyzed, from a cultural or bioethical perspective,
what constitutes a community of patients within the
healthcare system, or what ethical implications such cat-
egorizations of community have for care delivery. Having
discussed the operational criteria for a prosocial delivery
model, exemplified in the proposed grants, it is important
to justify the indispensable role of the patient community
in shaping, ethically and practically, the identities of pa-
tients with chronic diseases, the nature of their interac-
tions with each other and their providers, and the claims
they make on societal resources channeled through the
health care system (including those flowing from the gov-
ernment agencies and private foundations).
First, we must consider the scope of community. From
the perspective of a patient with a chronic condition, we
can conceive of the health care system as a series of
overlapping, nested communities. An academic medical
center is the geographical locus for a community of pa-
tients with a given condition who receive treatment at
that center. Members of this local community may re-
ceive treatment from the same physician, belong to the
same patient and family support groups, and volunteer
for or donate to the same disease-specific foundation.
Thus members of a local patient community interact
with each other face-to-face, sharing first-hand informa-
tion about treatment experiences, health status and life
challenges, and joining together at the same fundraising
or advocacy events. Such interactions create what
Mitchell refers to as “local and visible links”, since indi-
viduals’ knowledge of their neighbors’ well-being comes
from what they see and hear person-to-person rather
than from impersonal, anonymized statistics [13]. We
can also apply the notion of a patient community in
two broader senses: as encompassing all the patients
nationally or internationally who have a given chroniccondition, as well as the sum total of patients with a var-
iety of chronic conditions at a given academic medical
center or network of community health practices. Of
course, both the providers and chronically ill patients at
an academic medical center have profoundly personal
interests in the center’s research agenda and capacity to
deliver innovative treatments and procedures when no
adequate alternative exists. Nevertheless, in this analysis
providers constitute a stakeholder group distinct from
patient communities, unless they suffer from the symp-
toms of a given chronic disease or care for family mem-
bers who do (in which case their membership would
stem from their capacity as patients or caregivers).
As with patient communities, the family unit is an-
other sphere of community which creates, according to
some communitarian theorists, inherent entanglements
between its members, resulting in shared interests and
obligations [14]. In health care, of course, patients, pa-
tient communities and family units interact, in both pol-
icy advocacy and treatment decisions, but the role of
parents or siblings in a patient community is not neces-
sarily fixed. Indeed, the nature and degree of families’ in-
volvement depends on patient age and condition, in
addition to family-specific factors, such as family com-
position and belief and value systems. Parents and sib-
lings would be much less involved, in time, money, and
emotional investment, in the care of a 40-year old self-
sufficient patient with type I (Juvenile) diabetes than
they would be for a 2-month old Severe Combined Im-
munodeficiency patient who needs an HLA-matched
bone marrow transplant from a sibling. (Both of these
diseases are the subject of disease-specific iPS research).
So while families may have an intrinsic interest in re-
lated patients’ well-being—at least assuming that parents
are competent and siblings are willing to offer some sup-
port for each other—they should only be considered
members of patient communities if they are primarily
responsible for the patient’s health, are heavily commit-
ted in time and energy to caretaking, or are very active
in health advocacy, raising awareness of patients’ con-
cerns among providers, researchers, and policymakers.
Of these three conditions, the first would carry the
greatest weight. Even so, families’ involvement in such
communities should not automatically give them an in-
fluence over treatment decisions equal to that of men-
tally competent adult patients. For family members
without proxy, involvement in patient communities
would instead indicate their commitment to—and a cor-
responding interest in—improving patients’ quality of
life and directing societal resources towards their care,
so as to reduce the overall social burden of the disease.
So what is the nature of the community bonds be-
tween patients with the same chronic condition, and
what are the ethical implications for delivery of care?
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they share the same medical challenges, which pose a
similar threat to quality of life, and they have a shared
interest in securing a broad-based, well-funded, and
well-staffed research agenda for their condition. Families
may likewise share similar caretaking burdens. The toll
exacted by chronic conditions on patients and families
is well-suited for empirical assessment—whether in
terms of mortality, stress level, life satisfaction, absen-
teeism from work or school, etc. Patients have a shared
interest, often via the same therapeutic means, of over-
coming the burden of their condition, as reflected by a
score as close as possible to optimal on such metrics.
Of course, “optimal” can be a context-dependent desig-
nation, mediated, within a particular patient-physician-
caregiver relationship, by criteria including specific
sociocultural influences, family structure and the role
of familial interactions, and the patient’s functional
limitations—the last of which it is of course the par-
ticular job of medication and procedures to mitigate.
To the extent that all chronic conditions cause adverse
physiological symptoms, reduce quality of life, and
interfere with patients’ ability to live emotionally
fulfilling lives while participating fully and unrestrict-
edly in the activities of their choice—in school, work,
family life, recreation and exercise—all patients whose
conditions cannot be cured or adequately controlled
suffer harm, and those with the same condition and
treatment options suffer a similar type of harm. In
philosopher David Wiggins’s analytic definition, if a
lack of x necessarily causes one harm—with reference
to some objective “standard of flourishing,” and given
the stipulation that one’s behavior remains “morally
and socially acceptable” under circumstances which
are realistically conceivable (economically, physically,
technologically, culturally, etc.)—then one has a need
for x, even if one does not know it [15]. Admittedly the
degree of harm as well as the therapeutic options vary
based on condition. For example, regular insulin injections
may be sufficient to secure a normal quality-of-life for
many patients with type I diabetes. The only viable option
for SCID, however, is a bone marrow transplant, and type 1
spinal muscular atrophy (SMA), typically fatal by the age of
two, lacks any treatment options at all, making advances
in iPS and gene therapy all the more vital for SMA pa-
tients [6,16]. As Wiggins himself acknowledges, the notion
of harm can vary based on sociocultural context. But a
distinguishing characteristic of many severe chronic con-
ditions (e.g. muscular dystrophy, SCID, Fanconi Anemia,
SMA, Gaucher disease type III, Huntington’s Disease)
which are the subject of iPS research is that they are con-
genital and their underlying symptoms—the primary
health dangers and risks of the disease—cannot be ad-
equately addressed without (in many cases undeveloped)pharmacological, genetic, or stem cell-based interventions
[17]. In the health care context, such congenital genetic
disorders with severe or life-threatening symptoms are
perhaps the strongest candidates for an undeniably basic
need—one whose basicness stems from “laws of nature,
unalterable and invariable environmental facts, or facts
about human constitution” [15]. The lack of any alternative
therapies for addressing the need, and the constant fact of
not being able to fully actualize and re-develop one’s life
goals without treatment, may add to the need’s vitalness (to
use Wiggins’s terminology), reinforcing the strength and
rigor of the need claim.
Defending the ethical relevance of patient communities
From a libertarian perspective, Wiggins suggests that
“one aspect of [need’s] indispensability concerns the
defense it can afford to an individual, in a community
that has found a way of adjusting its institutions to its
sentiments…” [15]. But in contrast to a conception of
need as a justification for an individual right which pro-
tects against community encroachment, the interests of
patients with the same chronic condition may be so
closely aligned as to constitute an aggregate, consistent,
shared need that can be defined in very rigorous scien-
tific terms. Such aggregate needs have the same moral
force as individual needs. But because these needs en-
compass large groups and, in the context of iPS therapy,
potential remedies require a very high degree of tech-
nical sophistication, manpower, and information, the
duty to furnish these resources falls on societal institu-
tions and regulatory authorities. Indeed, within the
sphere of health care, beneficence is specially obligatory.
In this way, societal measures which recognize the col-
lective importance of addressing these shared needs are
justified. Such measures include insurance subsidies and
regulations—in particular, in the U.S., the Affordable
Care Act’s ban on coverage exclusions for pre-existing
conditions, and its elimination of lifetime limits (“caps”)
on the benefit payouts for health insurance policies—so-
ciety has assumed an explicit role in validating the needs
of those with chronic conditions and removing barriers
to accessing the objects of their need, i.e. medical ther-
apies [18]. Moreover, the high priority which society
places on the future therapeutic value and scientific
innovation embodied by stem cells is evident in the
massive amount of NIH grants distributed for embryonic
and non-embryonic stem cell research in 2012 alone [4].
Such social policies and regulatory priorities, justified on
the basis of shared needs, greatly facilitate the non-profit
action necessary for the accessible, community-focused
care delivery system defended here.
When societal resources (of money and knowledge
and manpower)—whether channeled directly through
government, or non-profit research institutions and
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a form biosocial regulation whose objects, at the policy
level, are not individuals but communities of patients
who share a need for access to a broader, more effective
range of therapies. Because patients’ identities intersect
with their membership in a community based on such a
shared need, their collective satisfaction of that need
must be defined in aggregate terms. It must stem from
networks of providers and research institutions which
consider patient communities central to their mission,
not only in order to translate research advances into
therapies which address the most clinically serious prob-
lems facing the community, but to deliver those therap-
ies in such a way as to maximize, given the extent of
available societal resources, the overall quality of life and
prognosis for those living with the disease. This con-
trasts with a neoliberal model, where individuals or en-
tities are divested of all communal linkages and the
question is: how can I devise the most profitable means
of giving individual customers a means of speculating on
their own disparate biological futures for their personal
benefit? Instead, the question we should ask is: given
society’s interest in addressing the shared needs of pa-
tient communities, how can we incentivize the delivery
of innovative treatments and stem-cell therapies so as to
give patients the assurance that society will use its re-
sources as efficiently as possible to minimize the harm
that their disease can cause them and their fellow com-
munity members?
Members of the patient community—and the founda-
tions which they may participate in, and which fundraise
and advocate for more research and better therapies and
improved access and greater awareness of patient chal-
lenges—benefit more directly than anyone else from so-
cietal recognition of the salience of their shared needs
through social policy. They are thus personally and fi-
nancially invested in enhancing the strength, validity,
and scope of their claim on society’s resources (whether
through government or public-private partnerships or
private foundations). Yet this claim rests on the collect-
ive nature of their needs, of which the patient commu-
nity is the embodiment. In this sense, we can conceive
of the foundations and affiliated patient organizations
and support groups, etc. as the organizational instru-
ments by which patient communities both respond to
and influence society, so as to negotiate the collective
societal status of community members’ medical needs.
This dialectic interaction imposes on the patient com-
munity and on the foundations a corresponding ethical re-
sponsibility to ensure that care is delivered prosocially—i.e.
in such a way as to incorporate the values of transparency,
collaboration, equity, and patient empowerment which are
a feature of the proposed grant system. Indeed, if the con-
cept of shared, aggregate needs, and a correspondinglyshared, aggregate claim on societal resources, is not merely
to remain an abstraction, members of the patient commu-
nity cannot be indifferent to each other’s well-being, or to
the resources and accessibility of a system which aims to
collectively maximize quality of life in the face of the
diseases from which they all suffer. The promotion of a
prosocial model thus reifies the very role of the commu-
nity as a crucial mediator between patient and society. As
a result, the community is optimally positioned to repay
the claim which it makes on society’s resources, so as to
ensure that society gets the best value for its health
care spending—in terms of the benefits which flow from
government-funded and non-profit research as well as
insurance access to commercially developed therapies,
which in the case of iPS would be highly expensive and
specialized biologics. The measurement of this societal
value derives from the effectiveness of society’s biosocial
regulation of chronic disease. The whole point of this
regulation (materialized at the cutting through prosocial
distribution of therapies such as disease-specific iPS) is to
neutralize the overall social harm of the disease to the
greatest extent possible, so as to maximize the potential of
the patient community to contribute to the quality and
emotional meaningfulness of its members' lives, as well
as to the ethical, cultural, and economic welfare of
society at large. At the micro-level, such regulation in-
volves minimizing the risk that the disease will inter-
fere with any given patient’s ability to access the career,
social, academic, and domestic opportunities available
to “healthy” individuals, or to lead an ethically and
emotionally fulfilling life. Even apart from the ethical
responsibilities flowing from shared needs, the patient
community’s familiarity with the medical challenges of
its members, without whom it wouldn’t exist, positions
it—via its associated organizations and philanthropies—as
the most suitable means of facilitating society’s interest in
minimizing the health insecurity which stems from chronic
disease.
Additionally, patient communities differ both from a
demographic which buys a particular consumer product
and from communities whose shared interests do not
amount to needs. Consider the interests of sports fans
or the demographic makeup of plasma TV buyers. A
particular plasma TV model, for example, may appeal
most to a demographic with empirically measurable
characteristics (a particular age range, education level,
income distribution, sex, etc.). But these common char-
acteristics relate to ownership of that TV in a way that
is merely incidental, since they are only relevant instru-
mentally for their marketing value (with the ultimate
goal being for the manufacturer to sell more units and
thus, hopefully, make a larger profit). Ownership of that
particular TV model does not constitute a response to a
shared threat to quality of life, as would be the case for
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tions discussed above. Nor, between the owners, does it
establish, embody, or modify any political, social or eco-
nomic connections, expressive of goals or perspectives
which would have a salient effect on owners’ social, do-
mestic, or personal identities. But what about a more
communal activity such as sports-watching or virtual
sports competitions? Even though individuals’ interests
in this case might be shared and relevant to social iden-
tity, they still likely amount to desires rather than needs.
At the very least no commentator has articulated a ra-
tional basis for needing government subsidies for pre-
mium sports channel subscriptions or game tickets. In
Wiggins’s formulation, if one desires something for a
particular reason, that desire is based on a belief that it
will yield a particular benefit; but if one needs some-
thing, one needs it regardless of whether one believes or
even knows about its effects [15]. A patient with SCID
needs a bone marrow transplant, because of the harm
that will arise from not having a functional immune sys-
tem—i.e. an inability to fight off opportunistic infections,
followed by likely death before the age of 1 [19].
Promoting relational autonomy and dignity
Moreover, the more involved, committed, and informed
the patient communities, the better patient advocates in
decisionmaking roles (e.g. grant-making) will be able to
represent patients’ perspectives and ensure that research
programs address the concerns that are most clinically
relevant to them. This is a critical concern for a pro-
social delivery system that aims to maximize its accessi-
bility and empowerment of patients. For example, 12
members of the 29-person governing board of the Cali-
fornia Institute of Regenerative Medicine (CIRM) must
be patient advocates, and some of these advocates also
serve on the CIRM working group that distributes grants
for stem-cell research (Sheehy, 2010, p. 1070) [20]. Based
on his own experience as a person with HIV, Jeff Sheehy,
the vice-chair of CIRM’s grants working group, notes
the critical role of his fellow advocates in raising aware-
ness of clinical challenges that are of great concern
to patients, but might be overlooked by other board
members and scientists. These include many existing
therapies’ inadequacy in addressing serious medical and
quality-of-life complications in those with chronic con-
ditions (e.g. “increased rates of heart-disease, non-HIV-
related cancers and neurological deficits”, in the case of
HIV). As Sheehy explains, “When [another CIRM] re-
viewer opines that he does not deem a proposal worth
funding because he doesn’t think anyone with HIV will
consider participating in clinical trials of an experimental
treatment, I answer that I would, and my voice has
changed the discussion” [20]. These patient advocates
have shared needs for more effective treatments andmore accessible delivery systems in common with other
members of their patient communities, and so their very
relevance stems from their status as members of such
communities—the perspectives they represent and the
concerns they raise must be inherently communal, com-
ing from shared aspects of the patient experience which
shed a more personal and penetrating light on the most
salient clinical obstacles in the way of the best attainable
quality of life. Thus the cultivation of more institutional-
ized and interconnected patient communities, via mech-
anisms such as the competitive grants proposed here,
will facilitate the jobs of patient advocates by expanding
patients’ access to information and the very therapies for
which the advocates are advocating. The result is likely
to enhance the influence and standing of patient advo-
cates, improving their communication with a better-
informed and more organized patient community, and
thus giving them a more coherent, representative, and
popularly legitimate narrative with which to develop and
justify strategies for addressing patient needs via grant-
making and policy.
To the extent that this proposal might more rationally
and effectively target treatments towards patients, im-
proving health outcomes, it would promote beneficence.
But it could also promote autonomy, based on bioethi-
cist Shlomo Cohen’s (2013) discussion of the ethical sta-
tus of “nudging” in health care [21]. According to Thaler
& Sunstein, who popularized the concept, a “nudge”, as
applied to a given set of choices, is “any aspect of the
choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a pre-
dictable way without forbidding any options or signifi-
cantly changing economic incentives” [21]. Nudging has
typically been suggested as a means for promoting eco-
nomically rational decisionmaking by individuals. Thus
my focus on its role in improving relational autonomy—
by structuring and expanding opportunities for patients
to actively define and re-define the nature of their in-
volvement in collaborative activities such as policy advo-
cacy, provision of feedback to institutions and providers,
and participation in clinical trials—may be novel, but it
is nonetheless consistent with the limited definition of-
fered above. As direct economic beneficiaries, the insti-
tutions that the proposed model would target would not
be the nudgees. Rather, the model would incentivize pro-
social care delivery systems to nudge good candidates
towards greater research participation and iPS treatment.
Thus academic medical centers should become more
committed to ensuring that their providers access, and
then share with patients, information about the broadest
relevant range of innovative or experimental treatments
and procedures (particularly in life-threatening cases)
and clinical trials, including those at other institutions—
since centers could still be awarded credit towards grant
scores for referrals. Additionally, the proposed model
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medical foundations (including disease-specific ones that
might partner to fund the grants) so as to empower pa-
tient communities on multiple levels. We might ration-
ally assume that the majority of patients, particularly
those with the severe chronic conditions which my
model focuses on, are looking to improve their own
health and self-sufficiency, minimize the caretaking bur-
den on their families, and contribute towards research
which would extend these benefits across the patient
community. Thus an expanded range of treatment op-
tions (where medically indicated and practically feasible),
and a greater opportunity to become involved in re-
search or advocacy, would likely expand autonomy by
“nudging people towards self-proclaimed goals” [21].
And even if certain patients or families have personal or
religious objections to participation, this model is in no way
coercive, and indeed could reward research ethics and pro-
fessional oversight boards (IRBs) for developing additional
protocols to safeguard patient autonomy. Moreover, a max-
imally transparent clinical and research agenda, one that fo-
cuses on ensuring that patients have optimal information
about their therapeutic options, is an essential precondition
for systems whose goal is to foster autonomous patients
who will make decisions according to their own best judg-
ment and values. d Indeed, referencing the behavioral eco-
nomics literature, Cohen notes that people tend not even
to form definite preferences outside of a given set of
choices, so that context and the mode of presentation can
determine preferences [21]. Thus medical systems which
would aim not only to uphold autonomy ad hoc, decision-
by-decision, but also to maximize patients’ faith and trust
in the system as a whole, would aim likewise to maximize
the extent to which patients can become actively involved
in learning about and managing their own care, so that
each patient has a (well-justified) impression that her med-
ical team considers her own concerns and goals of critical
importance in formulating a treatment plan.
In a broad sense, this goal is served by reinforcing pa-
tients’ sense of empowerment, coming not only from en-
gagement with their own treatment team, but also with
the patient community as a whole. Patients should feel
they have all the tools possible not only to make a differ-
ence in their own care, but also to contribute towards
research and policies which will benefit fellow patients
undergoing similar struggles. A patient community of
people well-informed and confident about their mission
is one that is much more valuable to each member, to
the advocates who represent them in policy and in gran-
tmaking bodies like CIRM, and to society as a whole—
and one in a much better position to achieve the ultim-
ate goal of minimizing the social harm of a particular
condition. This argument applies, on the smaller scale of
doctor-patient interaction and patient advocacy, one ofthe primary justifications for the indispensable value of
community to each of its members. As philosopher
Charles Taylor points out: “the free individual and au-
tonomous moral agent can only maintain his identity in
a certain type of culture… carried on in institutions and
associations which require stability and continuity and
frequently also support from society as a whole” [22].
Perhaps my model is most comprehensively captured by
barrister-bioethicist Charles Foster’s (2011) expanded
conceptualization of human dignity as a broad-based
bioethical value, one that measures the extent to which
all interactions in health care promote human flourish-
ing. For Foster, dignity is a state of life which best em-
bodies and perpetuates those qualities which are vitally
human, while recognizing our inherent interdependence
on each other—encompassing what makes us, as relational
beings, thrive at an emotional, moral, physical, and spirit-
ual level, based on empirical insights from medicine and
the social sciences [9]. This is a radically holistic concept,
and it obviously requires qualification in a particular con-
text. But if anything is dignity-promoting, surely it is a
model based on prosocial care delivery and strong patient
communities—collectively focused on the flourishing of
everyone in society with a given disease, and not only ac-
knowledging but embodying patients’ inherent intercon-
nectedness via their shared needs.
But if the patient community were an unqualified, ethic-
ally exclusive aspiration, it might justify unacceptable re-
strictions on patient autonomy, even to the extent of
compelling patients to participate in medical research. As
a value, prosociality in healthcare—manifested through
collaboration, transparency, patient-empowerment, and
equity—must still be balanced by a respect for autonomy.
An all-powerful community, one which could serve as a
justification for paternalistic coercion, might theoretically
intervene in patients’ treatment decisions without limit,
creating a medical culture which threatened rather than
reinforced patients’ and family caregivers’ sense of safety,
personal freedom, and faith in the legitimacy of the care-
delivering institution. Thus the proposed model reflects
the sort of “libertarian” or “asymmetric” paternalism ex-
emplified through non-coercive nudging [22]. A liberal
democratic respect for individual rights would make us
deservedly wary of any form of community that could
compel patients (or competent caregivers with proxy in
the case of children or non-competent adults), even under
limited circumstances, to participate in a particular study,
or to receive a particular treatment or experimental ther-
apy, even after being fully informed of the nature of the
intervention and rejecting it (as philosopher John Ladd
points out, an extreme form of coercive communitarian-
ism can even justify fascism) [23]. (Whether there are any
conceivable conditions that would justify such compulsion
is a question beyond the scope of this paper).
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Within the health care context, references to community
recur most frequently in the public health literature, but
the way the concept is used there differs from the strict
definition of a patient community offered here. By dis-
tinguishing the two conceptions, however, we may reveal
ways that the goals of patients needing highly specialized
care may be aligned with the quality-of-life concerns of
a more general population. Those working in public
health tend to think of community in a looser sense, as
what might be called a “public health network”—a more
broad-based web of institutions and providers focused
on meeting the public health needs of a particular, geo-
culturally delineated population, often within a primary-
care setting. Such a network might contain diverse
ethnic groups, along with some chronically and mentally
ill patients, who altogether would have partially overlap-
ping interests, goals, and needs, but the majority of its
members’ lives would not be as unavoidably intertwined
with the healthcare system as would necessarily be the
case for members of a patient community. Compared
with a patient community, then, such a grouping could
not have as uniform or specific a claim of need. How-
ever, members of a broader public health network might
have very similar policy goals centered around improv-
ing quality of life and community participation, often
expressed in terms of local issues—improved health edu-
cation in schools, more funding for community-health
centers, more providers who conduct preventive screen-
ings for diabetes or cancer. Thus the very broad-based
nature of such a network could draw together a multifa-
ceted range of intersecting interests, serving as a sort of
“umbrella” community. And this could create an inter-
face ideally suited for individual patient communities to
interact with each other, focus their volunteering efforts,
advocate for shared policy goals, and exert more influ-
ence on providers and the care delivery system. Indeed,
a community public health network, by design and by
history, is supposed to be more rhizomatic and receptive
to patient feedback [11].
The problem is that such networks have traditionally
had far fewer resources than multi-specialty academic
medical centers, so that when highly specialized therapies
(such as experimental stem cell transplants) are needed to
treat congenital or severe chronic diseases, patients have
had to resort to such centers as the most viable option for
treatment, perhaps subsequently having little incentive to
connect with community public health networks focused
on primary care. The proposed incentive scheme aims, in
part, to encourage academic medical centers to adopt the
patient-as-stakeholder mentality to which community
health centers (at least ostensibly) aspire, within the con-
text of a range of therapies which cannot be delivered
solely at the primary care level.b These groups could offerbasic follow-up and monitoring, health education—regard-
ing symptoms and best practices for avoiding complica-
tions and comorbidities, and for communicating effectively
with providers—as well as referral to the academic centers
(with which they might or might not be institutionally affil-
iated) for more specialized care, an arrangement which
might prove particularly useful for lower-income patients.
Moreover, the stronger, more engaged patient communities
which my proposal seeks to foster would be better posi-
tioned to partner with other stakeholders within the com-
munity public health network, so as to maximize their
overall influence on health-care decisionmaking and local
quality-of-life issues. Indeed, the proposal is broadly sym-
pathetic to proposals for community-based participatory
research, but would seek to extend its scope to specialized
care delivery, expand its aims in terms of patient involve-
ment in policy advocacy and institutional decisionmaking,
and ideally try to promote partnership between community
health practices and academic medical centers. NIH, for
example, has already created a network of “breast cancer
and the environment research centers”, involving collabor-
ation between “scientists, advocates, community members,
and health care providers” [24].
A similar arrangement, eliciting more direct participa-
tion from academic medical centers, and covering more
specialized chronic conditions such as those which are
the subject of iPS research, might allow for a more
complete systematization of patient participation and in-
fluence, one which harnessed biomedical in addition to
social science innovation. Within such a context, incen-
tivizing partnerships between community health net-
works and academic centers might also help to alleviate
the networks’ traditional difficulty in raising private
funding, given the tendency of domestic foundations
and wealthy donors to focus on groundbreaking scien-
tific innovation as opposed to primary care and preven-
tion. Indeed, if patient communities could achieve
greater policy impact and more influence over medical
decisionmaking by participating in community health
networks, then disease-oriented foundations interested
in the welfare of patient communities might also have
more incentive to focus on strengthening such networks.
Ethical foundations and the limits of “capability”:
response to criticism
The model proposed here, aimed at minimizing the
harm of chronic conditions by promoting a holistic, rela-
tional concept of quality of life—encompassing a broad
range of criteria, including health status, access to infor-
mation, opportunities for education, work, and recre-
ation, as well as the quality, variety and personal
meaningfulness of social interaction—which altogether
would facilitate human flourishing, may resemble and
complement the “capabilities approach” advocated by
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patient experience by Entwistle and Watt [25]. This ar-
gument does not deny such an overlap or the potential
synergies, in policy and in improved, relational metrics
for quality of life, which may result from it. However, it
is important to emphasize the instrumental rather than
the a priori nature of these synergies. Contrary perhaps
to Nussbaum, my proposal does not suggest that even
an expanded conceptualization of personal agency (e.g.
one involving emotional and interpersonal well-being as
well as rational decisionmaking capability) should be the
ultimate ethical aspiration. A more promising a priori
basis for dignity, one based on the inherent ethical po-
tential of life itself, may lie in a Levinasian concept,
whereby the Self ’s own corporeality places it in infinite
ethical subjection to the Other (a formal category which,
as Judith Butler puts it, serves as “a placeholder for the
infinite ethical relation”) [26,27]. A discussion of meta-
ethics, of what it means to respect the Other’s radical
alterity—of why one should have an obligation to act eth-
ically without ignoring the Other’s infinite demandingness,
whose trace a static ontologized self-concept or worldview
would disparage—is beyond this paper’s scope. But such
an aspiration (whose infinitude would render it un-
dischargeable and ultimately unfulfillable) would suggest
that, in making ethical arguments, it is the inherent quality
of ethical relations themselves that count. This relational
quality, the assessment of which is inevitably context-
dependent, may in most instances be enhanced by follow-
ing the capability approach, but the danger of following
the capability approach exclusively is that it might under-
mine the ethical value of relationships which involve car-
ing for someone with little or no capacity for agency, e.g.
patients who have severe dementia or anencephaly, or are
in a persistent vegetative state (PVS).
Indeed, many cultures do not share the Western no-
tion of individual autonomy, and this article’s focus on
the way that relational interaction can enhance and even
create the conditions for autonomy is partly an attempt
to expand the global applicability of the concept. The
mitigation of coercive, top-down interference by some
people and institutions in the lives of others, at both an
individual and a cultural level, would allow communities
of individuals to form and evolve temporally—without
being locked into a particular pattern of interaction
which cannot keep pace with cultural development, and
which accordingly may come to restrict opportunities
for beneficent action. Such a goal, expressed through a
concept such as relational autonomy (which in this argu-
ment is not supposed to imply a permanent, unvarying
method of achieving the goal) is expansive enough to
encompass a wide variety of different cultures. The pro-
social principles from which the grant criteria derive are
admittedly instrumental and culturally contingent, butthey are still the best means of upholding a relational
conception of human dignity vis-à-vis the clinical trans-
lation of medically innovative therapies for patients with
chronic diseases. Like autonomy itself, they are not ends
in themselves, but that does not mean that they still
aren’t ethically preferable or even obligatory within most
contexts.
Moreover, the aim of making advocacy more rhizo-
matic and participant-directed (as described below), e.g.
through the vehicle of patient communities, does not ne-
cessarily mean that the resources for such advocacy
must be exclusively provided by the participants, those
who belong to the particular community with the rele-
vant ethical claim. A patient community may exist, in
the ethical sense discussed here, whether or not that
community has resources of time and information and
money to pursue its goals, but that does not mean that
the provision of resources top-down, e.g. by a foundation
or medical center or government body not primarily
managed and funded by patients, will necessarily distort
the achievement of such goals. (Of course, many of the
people who fund and manage disease-specific founda-
tions do indeed have a family member affected by the
disease, and some may even suffer from it themselves).
Some concern about conflicts of interest is of course le-
gitimate, but this can be minimized through funding
mechanisms designed to preserve impartiality. Indeed,
social inertia and a structural lack of resources—of infor-
mation and money and manpower—will likely serve only
to marginalize the societal influence of the very patients
who constitute patient communities, outweighing the
risk that top-down funding may hinder patients from ex-
pressing their views in a manner of their choosing, or
may force them to conform to one particular policy per-
spective. The relevant concern is in the nature of the
procedures by which the community operates—do they
promote a lateral, non-hiearchical structure that is opti-
mally positioned to pursue its aims of patient empower-
ment within an evolving cultural context?
In the end, there is one overriding ethical and meth-
odological theme to my discussion of a prosocial delivery
system and a patient community based on shared needs.
While evaluating the circumstances of individual cases,
bioethicists may too often focus on patients and families
in isolation from the prevailing cultural and political
context in which the relevant problems occur, and may
pay too little heed to the mutually reinforcing potential
of patient interaction and advocacy. Although govern-
ment regulatory and institutional policies constitute the
framework for individual cases, such policies should
themselves be more responsive to patient input. Indeed,
the medical and regulatory context should be considered
through the lens of the collective societal status of pa-
tient groups—not merely as a set of procedures shaped
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offering the potential for a dynamic interaction with pa-
tient communities. Of course, major legislation (e.g. the
Affordable Care Act) does impose certain top-down limits,
defining socio-political paradigms which cannot be funda-
mentally altered without new laws (e.g. employment-based
insurance in the U.S.). But the resources and social influ-
ence of medical philanthropies and academic medical cen-
ters within the non-profit sector, as well as regulatory
bodies' discretion and reliance on expert input, along with
their potential for greater patient inclusion (e.g. in the case
of CIRM), may, regardless of new legislation, allow for the
adoption of shifts in patient-provider and patient-society
interaction which are more rhizomatic—affording oppor-
tunities for lateral, less hierarchical, and more closely
intertwined channels of patient feedback which can exert
meaningful influence on patient care. Thus stronger pa-
tient communities may not only enhance patient auton-
omy by facilitating a more active, informed patient role in
treatment decisionmaking. They may also give patients
the social clout to become a more important and less eas-
ily ignored stakeholder group in the governing of the care
delivery system which affects them more personally than
anyone else.
Summary
"Community" is one of the most salient buzzwords in
the public health and health policy literature, but the
ethical basis and implications of the concept of a patient
community have remained largely unexplored. This article’s
grant proposal aims to spur innovation in delivery of care
for patients with chronic conditions which are subjects of
disease-specific stem cell research, so as to contribute to a
more systematic, accessible and patient-influenced delivery
model, reifying the relevance of community via values of
transparency, equity, patient empowerment, and patient-
provider and inter-institutional collaboration. There is a
special focus on disease-specific iPS cell therapies because
the types of patients who would benefit from them have
congenital, severe, high-maintenance chronic conditions.
They accordingly have a very strong claim for medical need
and therapeutic intervention, must necessarily interact
regularly with health providers, and so have the greatest
stake in influencing, at a systemic level, the way their care is
delivered.
Moreover, the clinical testing of these therapies offers
an opportunity to design a new model for delivery of
medically innovative treatments to patients with chronic
conditions. Such a prosocial system is ethically premised
on the recognition of patients’ shared, aggregate needs
for societal support and access to medical innovation.
While this requirement of aggregate, shared, and con-
sistent need strictly defines the patient community, I in
no way intend to introduce a concept in contention withthe kind of broad-based, geo-culturally embedded public
health network which the public health literature typic-
ally refers to as a “community”. Indeed, public health
networks can serve as an interface through which strictly
defined patient communities can interact with more
broad-based groups or coalitions, advocating together
for health and quality-of-life-improving measures.
The discussion concludes by explaining the aims of
prosocial values—to not only expand treatment choices
and opportunities for patients to take a more active role
in the management of their own care, but also to con-
tribute towards shared patient goals through better-
informed advocacy. Such values accordingly promote
relational autonomy as well as other basic bioethical
principles, including beneficence and a holistic, relational
conception of human dignity.
Endnotes
aTherapeutically, the goal is to be able to safely trans-
plant reprogrammed cells back into the patient from
whom they were sourced, avoiding the risk of immune
rejection associated with transplants between unrelated
donors [5]. Disease specific stem cells can either be
sourced from embryos identified as carrying a disease
through pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (embryonic
stem cells—ES), or they can be developed by taking fi-
broblasts (a basic connective tissue cell) from individuals
with the disease and transducing them with tran-
scription factors which confer stem cell characteristics
(producing iPS—induced pluripotent stem cells) [17].
Researchers now prefer iPS cells because they can more
effectively model genetically complex diseases, and be-
cause disease-specific ES cells have limited availability
and can be logistically inconvenient to obtain [17].
bBut far from cutting community health centers out of
the picture, grants might incentivize academic medical
centers to partner with primary-care focused community
health groups. The “collaboration” criterion of my pro-
posal, however, would not be so broad-based as to cover
such partnerships, so an additional grant scheme would
be needed.
cMedicaid is a joint federal-state program for indigent
and disabled patients below certain income thresholds
(set at 133% of the federal poverty limit in states which
have accepted the additional Medicaid funding made
available through the Affordable Care Act).
dNudging is typically recommended as a means for
correcting irrational biases, in which individuals weigh
the utility of a given choice differently than its objective,
quantitatively determined value, resulting in a decision-
making “error”. The classic example is loss aversion,
“where the negative value people assign to a given loss is
larger in absolute terms than the positive value they as-
sign to the identical gain” (Cohen 2013, 8). My proposal
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the extent they help expand the quantity, quality, and
relevance of the information available to consenting pa-
tients who wish to take a more active role in the man-
agement of their care.
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